AUBURN DAM - AN HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION - The Taxpayers League has supported the Auburn Dam for years. The advent of the Sacramento Water Forum, whom worked for over six years to formulate the policy and agreements for water supply for the County through the year 2030, and my job as the League's representative, makes it incumbent on me to keep members informed as to the likelihood that the dam will ever be built. To make sense of the controversy over the dam, you must be aware of the different dams proposed, factions supporting each, and what motivates them.

THE CONTROVERSY - The controversy over whether a dam at Auburn will be built, and if so, the type, boils down to four possibilities, i.e., no dam; a dry dam for flood control only; an expandable dam for flood control which can be converted to supply water and electric power later; and a multi-purpose dam providing flood control, water storage, and power generation.

THE DAMS - There have been twelve "Auburn" dams investigated and of those, three recommended for construction at different times. Those investigated have included two "dry dams", an "expandable" dam, four "mufti-purpose dams", a "minimum pool" dam, a 500 year gated "flood control detention dam", three configurations for water storage only, and multi-purpose dams proposed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The three recommended dams are the original high arch dam approved by Congress in the 1960s, the 200 year expandable dam recommended in 1992, and the 500 year flood detention dam recommended in 1996. Dam advocates and local Congressmen worked to classify the last dam as "expandable", similar to the dam proposed in 1992, but with 500-year storm flood protection rather than 200 year.

THE SELECTED DAMS - There have been a number of multi-purpose dams proposed, differing in size and design, which affect the amount of water stored and the output of the electrical plant. The only one actually approved by Congress, in the 60's, was the original 2.3 million acre-foot high arched dam, discarded after an earthquake shook the Oroville Dam. All later dams of whatever nature, were straightened to get clear of the offending fault, and designs were changed to heavy, roller compacted concrete dams whose weights were capable of sustaining a 6.5 magnitude earthquake and a movement of eight inches. The expandable dam recommended in 1992 evolved from studies and public sessions held by the Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA). It was a compromise dam, close to what the Corps termed an "Advanced Features Dam". Their report states, "This concept consists of a single-purpose flood control dam with advance features that could be expanded later by non-Federal interests to meet water supply and power needs." The "Advanced Features" include blocked-off penstocks for

hydropower and a foundation for a wet well to supply water. The detention dam, recommended in 1996, is one of three options for flood control described in a Corps of Engineers report issued August 16, 1995. It was selected by SAFCA, and recommended to Congress for approval. The dam would have 894,000 acre-feet of floodwater detention space and would cost $934 million.

THE PROTAGONISTS - There were essentially 5 different groups in the Auburn Dam controversy:

1. The American River Authority (ARA) composed of Placer and El Dorado County and their respective water agencies, the Auburn Dam Council made up of the movers and shakers in the Placer area, and Congressman Doolittle, Senators Leslie and Ayala, and former Assemblymen Collins and Knowles were all multi-purpose dam supporters. Senator Ayala made two attempts to get approval of a $1-2 billion bond issue, backed by the state, to build and own a 2.3 million acre foot mufti-purpose dam. He assigned first priority for water to the Delta and San Francisco Bay to upgrade water quality, placing local water needs as a second priority and export water as third.
   
   Some of the group believed the first two priorities should be reversed, stressing those with water rights in the Area of Origin should be first. The Bills failed in a state senate committee. Assemblymen B.T. Collins and David Knowles worked together for a multi-purpose dam, built by the state along lines proposed by Senator Ayala. However, their Bills provided only $500 million, representing the state's share of the dam's cost to pay to protect Delta water quality. Collins later supported the expandable dam, provided it was truly expandable.

2. The County of Sacramento, San Joaquin County, the Sacramento Metropolitan Water Authority (SMWA) composed of local water purveyors, Sacramento Water Intelligently Managed (SWIM) made up of the movers and shakers in Sacramento, the Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA) made up of City and County elected officials and two local reclamation districts, former Congressman Fazio, and Congressman Matsui. These were expandable dam people, each with their own Agenda and reasons for being part of the odd and undefined coalition.

3. The City of Sacramento which has more than ample surface water and is most in need of a flood control dam, whatever its composition.

4. The Corps of Engineers whom are responsible for flood control only.

5. Local environmentalists who oppose any dam at Auburn. With them is the National Wildlife Federation, who will elevate any Auburn dam to a national issue.

In analyzing these groups be aware that the first, and part of the second, are multi-purpose dam people, differing only in strategy to get it built, and the priorities for use of the water.

I described the Protagonists and their positions. However, the pressures confronting the groups must also be described to understand what drives them. Local environmentalists oppose any dam on the river. Some modified their position in 1992 to the extent they would accept a dry dam. However, with the failure in 1992 to get support for a dam at Auburn, all now oppose the dam. They want 200 year flood protection achieved by raising and reinforcing levees, changing Folsom Dam operation to permanently provide for further draw-down of the reservoir, and changing the Dam's size and spillway. Their National counterparts opposed to any dam on the river and will make it a national issue if Congress appears ready to fund a dam program.

SAFCA and Politicians in Sacramento County and City are driven by the need for flood control now. They are essentially dry dam people, but compromised in 1992 by supporting the expandable dam to avoid a battle with multi-purpose dam advocates. SWIM, fearing a building moratorium if action was not taken on flood control, joined in support of the expandable dam.

The valley's water purveyors are nearly all multi-purpose dam supporters. The exception is the city who has extensive water rights on the American and Sacramento Rivers. The others, most on wells, are faced with two significant problems:

1. As demonstrated in the Water Forum process they all agree that groundwater overdraft must be halted. Conjunctive use of ground and surface water to stabilize the groundwater level is a primary objective.

2. They must find the water necessary for future expansion in the Sacramento Area. To do this new facilities must be built and the water rights of all purveyors must be protected.

1. Also in the game are the divided responsibilities of the two Government Agencies that build dams. The Corps of Engineers, part of the Department of Defense, builds flood control facilities only and has no interest in water storage or power generation. The Bureau of Reclamation, part of the Dept. of the Interior, is responsible for dams that store water and generate power. The separate nature of these two makes it extremely difficult to get them to work together. This difference has created a major problem. The Corps, in conjunction with SAFCA, completed a Flood Control Report before the Bureau began its American River Water Resources Investigation Planning Report. Consequently, the Bureau Report, funded by the SMWA, the City and County of Sacramento, the American River Authority, and the County of San Joaquin, was two years late in starting. As a result, the Corps Report reached Congress in time for the 1992 budget hearings. The Bureau Report was not even ready for submission for the 1996 budget, lacking completion of its Environmental Impact Study and Statement This difference created dissension among dam supporters. Group 1, in 1992, fearing Congress would approve a Corps' dry dam and deauthorize the multi-purpose dam, joined the expandable dam supporters. They pressed for a truly expandable dam, trying to devise a way to get language into anything presented to Congress to keep the multi-purpose option open. The dam issue in Congress became so contentious that the dam was dropped from the Public Works Authorization and the Appropriations Bill. Money was provided to continue the Federal Government's part of the cost of the Bureau's study, and the Corps of Engineers were instructed to examine other alternatives. This resulted in a supplement (1994). Based on the 1991 Report and the Supplement, the COE narrowed the options to three. They were:

2. The Folsom Modification Plan which lowers the winter water level by 720,000 acre-feet, lowers the dam's spillway, enlarges river outlets, shores up levees on the lower American River and heightens levees on the east side of the Sacramento River. Cost $326 million. The level of protection is the 180-year storm, not the 200-year level established as minimum in 1992.

3. The Folsom Stepped Release Plan which lowers the winter storage level by 670,000 acre-feet (present reoperation level), lowers the spillway, and enlarges river outlets. It increases the maximum release of water from 115,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to 180,000 which necessitates extensive modification of down stream levees and weir bypasses, and includes modification to Yolo levees, to handle increased flow. Cost $528 million. Level of protection is a 235-year storm. This is the option environmentalists pin their hopes on to offset a dam at Auburn.

4. The Detention Dam Plan, which is equivalent to the 400-year dry dam of the 1991 proposal with some modifications which include control gates in the river outlets in lieu of unrestricted open holes. Its construction would permit Folsom Dam to be operated with the traditional 400,000 acre-feet of flood control space used before the 1986 flood and retains Folsom's present maximum water release to 115,000 cfs, deleting need to modify Folsom Dam. The Detention Dam would have 894,000 acre-feet of floodwater detention space. Cost $934 million.

The COE made no recommendation in their alternatives Report, leaving the decision to SAFCA and the Reclamation Board. In the examination of the options it was obvious that two flood control detention dams, Folsom and Auburn, on the American, is vastly superior to modifying the Folsom Dam, shoring up the levees, and increasing Folsom's water release from 115,000 to 180,000 cfs. Of importance were the COE 1997 Report's statements, "For highly urbanized areas such as Sacramento, a flood control detention facility is preferred over levees. Reliance on high levees for flood protection in Sacramento is considered inherently less safe than an upstream detention dam." and the statement in the new supplemental Report, when addressing levee and other improvements which also warned that concerns would remain about the 180,000 cfs releases, even with levee improvements.

In 1996 local politicians agreed the COE Folsom Stepped Release Plan alternative to a detention dam at Auburn is a poor substitute for flood control and that a flood control dam at Auburn is essential to provide for the public safety. The Corps even repeated the warning in the 1994 Alternatives Report when addressing the Folsom Stepped Release Plan's requirement to increase Folsom Dam's maximum water release from 115,000 to 180,000 cfs, along with shoring-up levees and other improvements. They stated: "But even with these improvements, concerns would remain about such high releases." The local politicians endorsed the COE and SAFCA recommendation that a 500-storm year detention dam provided the best cost to benefit ratio. Unfortunately, attempts to convert the recommendation into Congressional legislation and inclusion of the cost of the dam and levee repair in the budget were unsuccessful. Instead, Washington did agree to allocate $57 million for fixes to the flood control system designed to achieve 100 year flood protection, and to scale back the $10 million yearly cost to $2.5 million to SAFCA as compensation from loss of power and water sales as a result of reoperating Folsom Dam. However, none of the $57 million was appropriated, stretching any work to be done with federal money until 1998.

In 1998 SAFCA, supported by Congressman Matsui, broke with those politicians who supported the Auburn Dam. Although SAFCA and Matsui continued to voice support for the Dam, they changed their position, based on recognition that Congress was not willing to provide money for the Dam. In an effort to get some improvement in flood control, they opted to support the dangerous Stepped Release Plan. This was opposed by Congressman Doolittle, who proposed rebuilding the cofferdam at Auburn, and the Auburn Dam Council who supported Doolittle. The battle in Congress raged through 1998, and the end result was that both proposals died.

In 1999 the Senate re-introduced the levee-raising plan. The attempt died in the House. Congress ultimately settled on approval of $285 million in new flood control measures for Sacramento. The approved measures allegedly will increase the level of protection in the valley from the present 95-year storm level to 145-year. The changes are principally to increase the size of the river outlets in the Folsom Dam, and to equalize the height of the levees on both sides if the American and Sacramento Rivers. SAFCA was successful in establishing a benefit assessment district to raise the local share of the cost. The federal government has not, as yet appropriated its share of the cost.

AUBURN DAM`S FUTURE, MY OWN VIEW - I believe a flood control Auburn Dam will be built. As demonstrated by the devastating floods of 1986, 1995 and 1997 each exposed a different weakness in our flood control defenses. In 1986 the assault on the American River watershed demonstrated the weakness of Folsom Dam operation and the levee systems of the Lower American and Sacramento Rivers which were nearly broached. The 1995 flood attacked the local drainage system, flooding creeks, streams and canals and demonstrated our surface drainage system was inadequate and in severe disrepair. The 1997 storm flanked the American River watershed and destroyed levees north and south of the city, inundating the floodplains. The Corps of Engineers warned in 1991 that, "For highly urbanized areas such as Sacramento, a flood control detention facility is preferred over levees. Reliance on high levees for flood protection in Sacramento is considered inherently less safe than an upstream detention dam." In its supplemental Report, when addressing levee and other improvements, they also warned that concerns would remain about the 180,000 cfs releases, even with levee improvements. Based on these comments, it appears the city of Sacramento must first be flooded to a depth of 15 feet (SAFCA estimate if the city's levees are broached or fail), and probably after the death of some of its citizens, before an Auburn Dam will be funded. Whether it will contain water will become a corollary battle with environmentalists.

Joe Sullivan